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COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE RULE OF LAW

HUMZA KAZMI*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The Roman orator Cicero is credited with the phrase ―Silent
enim leges inter arma‖—―When swords are drawn the laws fall
silent . . . .‖1 The nature of counterinsurgency conflict belies
Cicero‘s statement—in counterinsurgencies, laws must instead be
vibrant and active in order to secure success. Rather than a
convenience that can be restored at the cessation of hostilities, the
rule of law should play a fundamental role in the conflict. While it
may be possible for an incumbent power to succeed in a
counterinsurgency without a strong focus on the rule of law, this
success will likely come at an extremely high cost in terms of
military resources, civilian life, and international legitimacy.
1.1. Definitions
This
Comment
will
deal
with
terms
such
as
―counterinsurgency‖ and ―the rule of law,‖ which have gained a
certain cachet in contemporary discourse. Yet, there can be
significant disagreement on what these terms mean. In some cases,
this disagreement arises from confusion on the precise meaning of
a broad phrase,2 while in other cases, multiple terms have been
* Humza Kazmi (J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
2012) is a Senior Editor at the Journal of International Law. He would like to
thank Professors Jean Galbraith, Jacques deLisle, and Harry Reicher at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Professors Jon Sumida and Art
Eckstein at the University of Maryland, for the guidance they have provided—
both for this comment, and over the years. He would also like to thank his
parents, Qamar and Uzma Kazmi.
1 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Milone, in CICERO: DEFENCE SPEECHES 162, 186 [¶
11] (D.H. Berry trans., Oxford World Classics 2000) (52 BCE).
2 See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, How I Passed My U.S. Citizenship Test: By Keeping the
Right Answers to Myself, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 23, 2011, 5:31 AM),
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used to cover closely related, yet distinct phenomena. It is
important to clarify what is meant by these critical terms, so that
this Comment can progress without any confusion.
1.1.1. The Rule of Law
In September 2010, the University of Pennsylvania Law School
hosted a conference entitled Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and
Afghanistan: Challenges for the Coming Decade.3 Topics addressed at
the conference included federalism, administrative law, and the
integration of informal justice systems into a nation‘s judiciary, but
all those present seemed to take the meaning of ―the rule of law‖
for granted. While there is certainly a general understanding of
what sorts of topics fall within the penumbra of ―the rule of law,‖
namely topics dealing with governance and legitimacy, the
protection of human rights, and a functional and effective legal
system, the precise definition is vague. In their work Can Might
Make Rights? Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks
liken the state of the term ―rule of law‖ to Justice Potter Stewart‘s
definition of obscenity—an ―I know it when I see it‖ quality,
intuitively understood but not clearly defined.4
An obvious question then arises: Why is defining the rule of
law important? Does the generalized understanding not suffice?
As Stromseth and her co-authors pointedly note, ―as a guide to
making intelligent policy decisions, ‗I know it when I see it‘ is not
terribly effective.‖5 The idea of the rule of law playing a central
role in the resolution of foreign policy issues is long-standing and
widespread,6 but varying interpretations of the phrase amongst

http://www.propublica.org/article/how-i-passed-my-us-citizenship-test-bykeeping-the-right-answers-to-myself (discussing varying perspectives of the term
―rule of law‖).
3 See Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan: Challenges for the Coming
Decade, Agenda, PENN LAW (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.law.upenn.edu
/international/conferences/ruleoflaw/agenda.html (providing a description of
the topics and speakers present at the University of Pennsylvania Law School‘s
symposium).
4 JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF
LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 56 (2006) (discussing the elusiveness of the
term ―rule of law‖ and the importance of defining it).
5 Id. at 57.
6 See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Promoting the Rule of Law in the Post-Cold War Era, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 4–6 (Norman Dorsen & Prosser Gifford eds.,

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/6

06 KAZMI (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/15/2012 11:23 AM

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND RULE OF LAW

873

policy planners and administrators7 has the potential to severely
damage efforts to implement such an ill-defined goal.
The primary competing definitions of the rule of law are
centered on whether the phrase should simply mean the ―formal
and structural components‖ present within a legal system and
society‘s recognition of it, or encompass both structural
components and ―particular substantive commitments.‖8 Thomas
Nachbar, in his article Defining the Rule of Law Problem, chooses a
maximalist, substantive approach, and distills U.S. military
doctrine on the definition of the rule of law into seven categories:
state monopolization of force, security of person and property, law
constraining state action, stable and clear law, individual recourse
to a fair legal system, protection of basic human rights, and daily
reliance on legal institutions.9 While others present somewhat
different criteria (for instance, replacing state monopolization of
force with a broader ―military and security systems that function
under the law‖10), Nachbar‘s criteria bear the greatest resemblance
to those used by the U.S. military, and will be used for the
purposes of this Comment.11
2001) (describing the need for rule of law promotion in U.S. foreign policies
supporting democratic reform).
7 See, e.g., TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 9 (2010) (supporting the idea that
the rule of law does not require an unqualified admiration of the law but which
accepts that people would rather live with the rule of law); STROMSETH ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 58–61 (describing the surge in rule of law promotion by the United
States and other countries); JORIS VOORHOEVE, FROM WAR TO THE RULE OF LAW:
PEACEBUILDING AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT 96 (2007) (noting the growth of
international assistance for legal reform during the 1990s and the importance of
recognizing the different legal systems to which such assistance is provided);
Grant Kippen & Scott Worden, Election Aftermath and the Rule of Law in
Afghanistan, FOREIGN POL‘Y, AFPAK CHANNEL (Jan. 21, 2011, 10:47 AM),
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/21/election_aftermath_and_the_
rule_of_law_in_afghanistan (discussing how corruption in Afghanistan‘s 2011
elections undermines the rule of law).
8 STROMSETH, supra note 4, at 70–71 (noting that the minimalist conception of
the rule of law emphasizes formal and structural components whereas the
substantive theories insist on particular substantive commitments, for instance, to
human rights).
9 Thomas B. Nachbar, Defining the Rule of Law Problem, 12 GREEN BAG 303,
306–307 (2009).
10 VOORHOEVE, supra note 7, at 91.
11 In fact, Nachbar‘s article was developed from Chapter 2 of Rule of Law
Handbook: A Practitioner’s Guide for Judge Advocates, published in 2008 by The Judge
Advocate General‘s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army and the Center for Law and
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1.1.2. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
In contrast to the debate surrounding the meaning of the term
rule of law, the meanings of the terms ―warfare‖ and ―insurgency‖
remain relatively stable. Carl von Clausewitz famously stated in
his work On War that ―war is not merely an act of policy but a true
political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried
on with other means.‖12 This definition holds true for all wars, but
perhaps most so for the subsets of irregular warfare known as
insurgency and counterinsurgency. As the U.S. Army field manual
on counterinsurgency notes, insurgencies are ―politico-military
struggle[s] designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an
established government, occupying power, or other political
authority while increasing insurgent control.‖13 Thus, insurgencies
(and counter-insurgencies—actions taken to oppose an insurgent
movement) are violent struggles for political supremacy between
an insurgent group and an incumbent.
Clausewitz defines war as ―an act of force to compel our enemy
to do our will.‖14 Compulsion and will are at the heart of conflict.
The ability of one party to outlast the other and to persist in
conflict beyond the ability or will of its opposition provides that
party with victory. Insurgencies are set apart from other conflicts
by the resources that both the incumbent and the insurgent use to
fight the conflict. Rather than seeking to achieve a political end
primarily through the control of territory, the two sides are
competing for control over and support of the population.15 The
populace functions as both the resource and the objective for the

Military Operations. The Handbook has since been superseded by the 2010 edition,
to which this Comment will refer. Nachbar, supra note 9, at 303.
12 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 99 (Michael Howard & Peter
Paret eds.
and trans., 1993) (1832).
13 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY,
(2006), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf.
14 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at 83.
15 See Octavian Manea, Interview with Dr. John Nagl, SMALL WARS J. 1, 2 (Nov.
11, 2010, 10:35 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/599manea.pdf [hereinafter Nagl Interview] (―The counterinsurgent and insurgent are
both competing to win the support of the population.‖).
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two sides,16 with both insurgent and incumbent attempting to
obtain and secure the population‘s allegiance.17
This unique dynamic is why the reporter and
counterinsurgency expert Bernard Fall noted from his observations
in Vietnam that ―[w]hen a country is being subverted it is not
being outfought; it is being outadministered.‖18 Fall saw the North
Vietnamese National Liberation Front seeking to neutralize the
Saigon government‘s administrative power, and thus its already
tenuous connection with the populace, by eliminating village
chiefs and replacing them with their own leaders.19 Fall‘s
observation gets to the heart of one of the crucial dynamics in
counterinsurgency—a competition to provide the population with
control and an established government.20
Clausewitz also mentions that ―the defensive form of warfare is
intrinsically stronger than the offensive‖ because of several factors:
delay benefiting the defender, the conservation of force in defense,
and the passive objective of defense.21 In considering the dynamics
of insurgencies, it is important to consider that the incumbent
generally assumes the role of the attacker rather than defender.
Even though the incumbent may appear to have political and
military control over its territory, and will certainly claim such, the
blunt truth is that, if this were the case, there would be no
insurgency. The incumbent must persuade the population that its
control and government are superior; the insurgent is successful if
they are capable of frustrating the incumbent‘s design. The
16 See DAVID GALULA, PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA 1956–1958, at 246 (2006)
(explaining that destroying an insurgent‘s forces and occupying its territory is
ineffective without gains in support from the population under control).
17 See DOUGLAS PIKE, VIET CONG: THE ORGANIZATION AND TECHNIQUES OF THE
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM 287 (1966) (―Administration in the
liberated area, above all else, was an effort to create and maintain a population
devoid of disenchantment, immune to GVN influence, and in fact hostile to any
anti-NLF activity regardless of source.‖).
18 BERNARD FALL, LAST REFLECTIONS ON A WAR 220 (1967).
19 See id. at 218–219 (noting that the village chiefs‘ deaths were clustered in
areas where the Communists alleged violations of a cease-fire agreement).
20 See, e.g., David Axe, New Afghanistan Plan: Hole Up in Fortress Districts,
WIRED (Mar. 29, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011
/03/new-plan-for-afghanistan-fortress-districts/ (examining divisions between
supporters of the NATO and Afghan coalition and the insurgency in
Afghanistan‘s Baraki Barak district).
21 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at 428.
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incumbent is generally forced into the position of the attacker, of
being presented with a positive task (establishing governance),
because of prior circumstance that has already cost it the support
of the population.22
There is a school of counterinsurgency strategy that this
Comment does not address. In 1982, in response to a growing
revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Hama,23 Syrian
President Hafez al-Assad ordered a brutal strike on the city, killing
up to 20,000 people24 and halting the Brotherhood‘s revolt, which
was comprised of an estimated two hundred fighters.25 While
certainly effective at quelling the insurgency, the human costs were
appalling. The mass killing of a population, as seen at Hama, is
fundamentally against the laws of war as practiced by the
international community, and violates the Hague Convention,
which enshrined the laws of war,26 and the Fourth Geneva

22 See ANTHONY JAMES JOES, RESISTING REBELLION: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF
COUNTERINSURGENCY 24 (2004) (explaining how a popular election can bring about
peaceful power transitions, but can also, in its absence, bring about insurgency).
When referring to Joes‘s work, one must take caution in his use of the term
―guerrilla warfare‖ as being synonymous with an insurgency. Cf. FALL, supra note
18, at 210 (―[R]evolutionary warfare equals guerrilla warfare plus political action. .
. . [E]verybody knows how to fight small wars. . . . Political action, however, is the
difference.‖). While Fall rejects the terms ―insurgency‖ and ―counterinsurgency‖
in favor of ―revolutionary warfare,‖ id., counterinsurgency has gained enough
traction in discourse that it is preferable in this context to ―revolutionary warfare.‖
See, e.g., DAVID C. GOMPERT & JOHN GORDON IV, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: BUILDING
COMPLETE AND BALANCED CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY 76 (2008) (―[T]he
U.S. government tends to come to grips with insurgencies only after they become
threatening.‖).
23 See David Hirst, Stability Without Hope, GUARDIAN (Manchester), Dec. 21,
1982, at 11 (examining the legacy of the 1982 Hama massacre in Syria).
24 See Robert Fisk, Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights in Syria,
INDEPENDENT,
Sept.
16,
2010,
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion
/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-freedom-democracy-and-human-rights-in-syria2080463.html (discussing the Hama massacre and interviewing the son of the
Syrian commander at Hama).
25 See SYR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., THE MASSACRES OF HAMA: LAW
ENFORCEMENT
REQUIRES
ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.shrc.org/data
/aspx/d0/1260.aspx#D1 (last updated Feb. 19, 2004) (detailing the atrocities that
occurred at Hama, and examining whether these atrocities were ―committed to
enforce the law and preserve order or just to save the regime‖).
26 See Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 25–27, Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (discussing the treatment of sieges in
international law, prohibiting assaults on undefended towns, and stating that ―all
necessary steps should be taken to‖ avoid destruction of non-military targets).
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Convention, which set protections for civilian populations.27
Destroying an entire city in order to halt the actions of two
hundred individuals violates all principles of proportionality and
is fundamentally illegitimate. While the massacre may have
secured al-Assad‘s regime against the Muslim Brotherhood, this
Comment presupposes that the incumbent is acting in pursuit of
legitimate ends and within the bounds of international law.
A counterpoint to this line of reasoning is that the Hama
massacre was initiated by a state against its own populace and
therefore the conventions discussed above do not apply.28
However, this thinking is fundamentally shortsighted. The Hague
and Geneva Conventions have entered the realm of customary
international law; as they were designed and intended to provide
constraints on the use of force by states, it is only logical that these
constraints be applied to internal conflicts, such as insurgencies.
1.2. Rule of Law and Counterinsurgency—Why is There Tension?
A successful counterinsurgency generally requires winning the
loyalty of the population away from the insurgency through
superior provision of security and governance—two criteria that
integrate well with the factors required for establishing the rule of
law.29 However, the incumbent‘s methods for establishing security
for the population, especially the use of force against the
insurgency, can often cut against, or even directly oppose, the
requirements of legitimate governance. For example, the enforced
uprooting and resettling of populations, as was done throughout
twentieth-century insurgencies (to deny insurgencies population

27 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (discussing
grave breaches of the Convention, including willful killing not justified by
military necessity).
28 See Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian
Law, 62 A.F. L. REV 1, 33–34 (2008) (suggesting, through analogous reasoning, that
―customary law, not treaty law,‖ governed America‘s 2003 invasion of Iraq).
29 See Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing the challenges
counterinsurgents face in winning over the population). But see Octavian Manea,
Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War: An Interview
with Colonel Gian Gentile, SMALL WARS J. 1, 1 (Dec. 14, 2010, 7:37 PM),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/625-manea.pdf
[hereinafter
Gentile
Interview]
(suggesting
that
population-centric
counterinsurgency is not the only way to combat counterinsurgencies).
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centers to subvert or control),30 cuts against the ‗property security‘
and ‗constraint of state action‘ categories within Nachbar‘s
categorization of the rule of law. Insurgent groups are not as
constrained by the same need for legitimacy, and are thus more
likely to ―use violence, intimidation, and terror to coerce support
from the population.‖31 Furthermore, the use of force against
insurgents often leads to destruction of infrastructure and civilian
casualties, hampering the counterinsurgency effort, but also
inhibiting establishment of the rule of law (particularly the
components of security and human rights guarantees).32
Requirements of the rule of law can also pose problems for the
practice of counterinsurgency. For example, it is difficult to say
that a judicial system is fair or reliable where former insurgents are
are allowed to go free and to avoid any legal punishment for
actions they may have taken as insurgents. However, to achieve a
cease-fire and provide security, an incumbent may be forced to
extend amnesty and forego holding insurgents accountable, as well
as co-opt less committed insurgents through political
accommodation and acceptance.33 Similarly, requiring criminal
prosecution significantly complicates the procedure for detaining
suspected insurgents. Along with planning the use of force
required to capture the insurgent, the incumbent will also need to
30 See, e.g., JOES, supra note 22, at 106–113 (detailing resettlement efforts in
countries with significant guerilla insurgencies); see also NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT
SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM 309 (1988) (discussing the
Strategic Hamlet Program of forced relocations instituted by the South
Vietnamese government).
31 Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 2.
32 See Spencer Ackerman, Twenty-Five Tons of Bombs Wipe Afghan Town Off
Map, WIRED (Jan. 19, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom
/2011/01/25-tons-of-bombs-wipes-afghan-town-off-the-map/
(noting
that
―property destruction . . . reset[s] the clock on any nascent positive impressions‖).
But see Paula Broadwell, Travels with Paula (III) Arghandabis Like the Coalition
Reconstruction Efforts, FOREIGN POL‘Y, THE BEST DEFENSE (Jan. 23, 2011, 12:26 PM),
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/23/travels_with_paula_iii
_arghandabis_like_the_coalition_reconstruction_efforts (arguing that property
destruction from airstrikes does not ―necessarily lead to setbacks in the
operational design or overall strategy‖).
33 See Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that ―insurgencies are rarely
defeated militarily‖ but instead ―end through political accommodation‖); see also
ANGELIKA SCHLUNCK, AMNESTY VERSUS ACCOUNTABILITY: THIRD PARTY
INTERVENTION IN DEALING WITH GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INTERNAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 248 (2000) (citing the ―long tradition in Latin and
Central America‖ of providing amnesty to those who commit political crimes).
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consider additional factors, such as whether the insurgent has
committed a crime or whether there is sufficient evidence for a
court to convict the insurgent.34
2.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNTERINSURGENCY
AND THE RULE OF LAW

The process of establishing the rule of law after a conflict
occurs has been investigated by many scholars. Unfortunately, a
dichotomy is often presented between armed conflict and the rule
of law,35 suggesting that efforts to establish the rule of law can only
begin once a conflict has ended36—a viewpoint made especially
ironic by citing examples of ongoing conflicts under the postconflict heading.37 The argument goes that the rule of law requires
social order and that social order requires an established
government with all conflict ended.38
This theoretical approach ignores the practical realities of a
society and its existence; any society, even one embroiled in
conflict, will still require some method of a legal system. The
process of establishing the rule of law, or indeed any major change
within the system of a society, cannot be taken in a strictly linear
fashion.39 As Charles Norchi notes, ―[s]ecurity is the precondition
34 See Richard Morgan, The Law at War: Counterinsurgency Operations and the
Use of Indigenous Legal Institutions, 33 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV 55, 67 (2010)
(indicating that precursors to arrest in a criminal justice system may threaten the
secrecy of counterinsurgency operations and that detention by a foreign military
may disrupt criminal prosecution of the detained).
35 See, e.g., Fairlie Chappuis & Heiner Hänggi, The Interplay Between Security
and Legitimacy: Security Sector Reform and State-Building, in FACETS AND PRACTICES
OF STATE-BUILDING 31, 32–33 (Julia Raue & Patrick Sutter eds., 2009) (describing
security sector reform as a means of re-establishing security and restoring
legitimacy in a post-conflict environment).
36 See VOORHOEVE, supra note 7, at 53–54 (analogizing ―[p]ost-conflict
peacebuilding‖ to emergency care, where there is a brief crucial time in which reestablishing security and public order is often carried out ―without a complete
legal basis‖).
37 See, e.g., STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 85–133 (examining instances of
―post-conflict governance‖ but extending this term to ongoing conflicts).
38 See VOORHOEVE, supra note 7, at 121–22 (noting that the role of social order
in small group societies and the subsequent growth of modern states is a good
development only if these states contribute to a ―high quality of human life‖).
39 See FRANK HERBERT, DUNE 30 (Ace Books 1999) (1965) (―‗A process cannot
be understood by stopping it. Understanding must move with the flow of the
process, must join it and flow with it.‘‖).
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of effective legal reform, yet security itself is dependent on the
formal existence, at least, of operational law and state
institutions.‖40 Security and the rule of law operate in a synergistic
relationship, with success (or failure) in one directly affecting
progress in the other. Scott Dempsey, a former development
officer in Afghanistan‘s Helmand province, has commented that
―the only meaningful metric for success [in counterinsurgency] is a
transfer of sustainable sovereignty to the institutions we can easily
create, but which the Afghans must learn to run.‖41 This
resumption of state function can only happen if the rule of law is
incorporated as a simultaneous goal of counterinsurgency, rather
than a task to be undertaken after security has been established.
2.1. Counterinsurgency and Legitimacy—Why Establishing the Rule
of Law Assists Counterinsurgency
As discussed supra Section 1.1.2, counterinsurgency is focused
on ―out-governing‖ the insurgency—ensuring that the population
is provided with security, stability, and access to effective
governance. By taking measures to promote the rule of law, an
incumbent can provide a population with more effective and
trustworthy institutions, increasing the incumbent‘s legitimacy and
making an increasingly persuasive case that working with the
incumbent is the best option available to the population.
Establishing trustworthy, fair, and reliable governance is one of the
most compelling ways to encourage popular support for the
incumbent, or, at a minimum, to prevent the insurgent from
establishing its own reputation for governance and superseding
the incumbent‘s control.42
By supplying the population of an area with a government that
it considers legitimate and capable of providing essential services
in basic and fundamental areas, the population will be more likely
40 Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of Nation-Building: An Introduction,
60 ME. L. REV. 281, 291 (2008).
41 Scott Dempsey, The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration, SMALL WARS J.
1, 2 (Mar. 11, 2011, 10:50 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/10354.
42 See, e.g., Abu Muqawama, Special Abu Muqawama Q&A with Nick Blanford,
CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., ABU MUQAWAMA (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:41 AM),
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/11/special-abu-muqawamaqa-nick-blanford.html (discussing the provision of social welfare services,
education, and medical aid as part of a non-state actor‘s strategy for building
long-term popular support).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/6

06 KAZMI (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/15/2012 11:23 AM

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND RULE OF LAW

881

to consider the incumbent as being capable of providing security
and governance in the long term.43 Furthermore, by demonstrating
that the government is legitimate and functioning in a clear and
above-board manner, the incumbent may begin to dispel some of
the complaints that may have initially fueled the insurgency.
Success often leads to further success; by gaining popular support,
an incumbent is increasingly capable of exerting greater political
control over the population and controlling the insurgency.
2.2. Counterinsurgency and Security—How a Successful
Counterinsurgency Assists the Rule of Law
As a counterinsurgency provides increased security and safety
to a population,44 it strengthens societal institutions that relate
directly to the rule of law. The basic provision of security requires
not only military control, but political control as well—a control
established through a functional police force and judiciary.45 While
support for the police and judiciary is primarily intended for
increasing individual security by curtailing crime and ensuring
that the populace retains confidence in the government, this
support also aids rule of law efforts by ensuring that the tools for
expanding and supporting the rule of law are secured and extant.46
However, merely strengthening institutions is insufficient to
properly help establish the rule of law.47 Along with providing

43 See Octavian Manea, Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen (Nov. 7, 2010, 6:43
PM), SMALL WARS J. 4, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docstemp/597-manea.pdf [hereinafter Kilcullen Interview] (―Deiokes is a story about
how a local tribal elder becomes powerful in his own area, by mediation and
dispute resolution, and issuing judgments that gain the support of population.‖).
44 See Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 3 (examining ways that an incumbent
can gain popular support by providing security through political
accommodation).
45 See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 142–44 (noting that security tasks vary
among post-conflict environments, but that they usually entail protection of
political leaders, demobilization of belligerents, control of crime, and protection of
local infrastructure).
46 See id. at 184 (noting that support for these judicial bodies with the aim of
encouraging security may risk compromising other goals of an effective judicial
system).
47 See, e.g., Chappuis & Hänggi, supra note 35, at 45 (―[R]eforms aimed solely
at modernising and professionalising the security forces and thereby increasing
their capacity without ensuring their democratic accountability are not consistent
with the [Security Sector Reform] concept.‖).
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direct support to rule of law institutions like the police, prison, and
judiciary, a successful counterinsurgency is also likely to increase
the efficacy of governmental administration and the provision of
justice. For example, the RAND Corporation‘s 2010 volume
Reconstruction Under Fire: Case Studies and Further Analysis of Civil
Requirements identifies the provision of ―equal access to justice for
all Iraqis‖48 as a critical area for improving Iraq‘s Anbar province.
RAND calls for direct assistance to rule of law institutions,49 but
also identifies access to justice for the Sunni population as a
fundamental need for establishing security in the area. The report
further provides suggestions for how Sunni access to justice in the
long term can be implemented.50 This effort to strengthen the rule
of law may be a part of counterinsurgency operations by happy
accident, rather than explicit design, but it is present nonetheless.
2.3. Entwined Failures—How Failures in One Branch Affect the Other
Just as successes in counterinsurgency can assist the rule of law
and vice versa, failures in one can lead to ongoing problems in the
other. Failures in providing security can result in catastrophes in
implementing the rule of law. One stark example of this is Iraq in
the wake of the American invasion. As Phillip James Walker
describes:
Through looting, Iraq lost its law. Literally, no intact copy
of the Iraqi law remained in the Ministry of Justice or any
other public location in Baghdad. Iraq lost 80 years of
reported cases. Iraq lost property records. It lost records of
government proceedings. In the months after the looting,
48 BROOKE STEARNS LAWSON ET AL., RECONSTRUCTION UNDER FIRE: CASE STUDIES
AND FURTHER ANALYSIS OF CIVIL REQUIREMENTS 118 (2010).
49 The
RAND study identifies
counterinsurgency activities:

among

the

civil

requirements

of

Establish a rule-of-law complex [which] would be a ―heavily fortified
compound to shelter judges and their families and secure the trials of
some of the most dangerous suspects‖. . . . Deliver . . . desks, podiums,
beds and housing shelters for judges and their families, lawyers, legal
assistants, prisoners, and witness . . . . Train . . . civil servants involved in
the judicial process . . . with high professional and ethical standards . . . .
Provide technical assistance . . . in the form of legal advice . . . .
Id. at 120.
50 Id. at 119 (arguing in support of decentralized justice and noting that a
majority of the judiciary and police appointees are Shi‘a and located in Baghdad).
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Ministry of Justice employees reassembled some of the lost
documents, painstakingly collating the thousands of pages
scattered haphazardly throughout the Ministry of Justice.
However, even with a heroic effort by Ministry staff, a great
deal had been lost. In a sense, Saddam, war, and looting
undermined the very foundations of the Iraqi state. Not
only did Saddam‘s government collapse; the building
blocks of government—all government—also collapsed.
Saddam took the state down with him.51
While Walker attributes this failure to Saddam Hussein rather than
the American forces present, he does concede one page later that
this was a ―Coalition failure to stop the looting.‖52 This failure to
provide sufficient security led to a disruption of the entire state
governance apparatus, destroying the continuity of the state.
Conversely, failures in hewing to the rule of law can lead to
disasters in the counterinsurgency. In June 1956, Robert Lacoste,
the French governor-general of Algeria, executed two members of
the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency, in reprisal for an
ambush and destruction of a French platoon the month before.53
Lacoste‘s action, taken in large part to placate the pied-noir
population‘s desire to exact revenge,54 ultimately spurred many
Algerians to join the FLN and helped to spark the FLN bombing
campaign known as the Battle of Algiers.55
One problem that can arise in counterinsurgency is that the
population avoids commitment to one side or the other, but prefers
to ―hedge [its] bets‖ and utilize the governance of both insurgent
and incumbent, depending on which party is ascendant at the
time.56 This does not arise from a desire to prolong the conflict,
although it will likely have that effect; instead, it is a survival
51 Phillip James Walker, Iraq and Occupation, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?
APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 259, 271 (David Wippman
& Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).
52 Id. at 272.
53 See ALISTAIR HORNE, A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954–1962, at 153
(1977) (detailing the challenges associated with the counterinsurgency in Algeria).
54 See id. at 183 (examining Lacoste‘s possible motives).
55 See id. at 153, 185 (examining the fallout from Lacoste‘s response).
56 See Benjamin Wittes, More Response to Brig. Gen. Martins, LAWFARE (Dec. 7,
2010, 10:59 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/more-response-to-briggen-martins (explaining the strategic dimension to counterinsurgency and alliance
formation).
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strategy based on the fact that these civilians ―are surrounded from
all sides by . . . people demanding their allegiance—and willing to
hurt them if they don‘t get their allegiance.‖57 However, this does
not necessarily mean that the population is equally likely to
support either side. It can just as easily be that the population is
balancing the risks of supporting the insurgency58 against striking
out against a government it despises.59 Even if the incumbent
manages to gain control over a territory, there is no guarantee that
this control will persist once the incumbent‘s forces leave.60 Great
care must be exerted to ensure that any changes wrought by
incumbent forces will persevere once direct military presence in a
territory is withdrawn.61
3.

PITFALLS—POSSIBLE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COUNTERINSURGENCY
AND THE RULE OF LAW
3.1. Detention, Interrogation, and Torture: Short-term Security or
Legitimacy?

An incumbent is faced with extremely difficult choices during a
counterinsurgency. While external threats are relatively easy to
isolate and deal with directly, an insurgent group is an amorphous
and inherently clandestine organization. Engaging a successful
insurgent movement primarily through military force may be
analogized to punching water—while there may be significant
impact at given points, the bulk of the insurgent forces will seek to

Kilcullen Interview, supra note 43, at 3.
See DAVID W.P. ELLIOTT, THE VIETNAMESE WAR: REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN THE MEKONG DELTA 1930–1975, at 127 (2007) (noting that the populace
of the Mekong Delta favored the Communist insurgency, but were not willing to
directly support it when this meant risking the security and safety of the village).
59 See Stathis N. Kalyvas & Matthew Adam Kocher, How “Free” is Free Riding
in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem, 59 WORLD POL.
177, 191 (2007) (concluding that nonparticipation in an insurgency can be even
more costly than siding with either insurgent or incumbent).
60 See Josh Boak, In Rural Afghan Village, Local Security Takes Root, WASH. POST,
Mar.
1,
2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030103947.html (―‗As soon as the Marines leave
Helmand province, the people will fight the government,‘ said Commander
Sarwar . . . [of] the Afghan National Police.‖).
61 See id. (noting the transience of counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan‘s
Helmand province).
57
58
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flow away from the engagement, disperse and strike other areas.62
Because of this elusive nature inherent to insurgencies, it becomes
crucial for the incumbent to gain intelligence about the insurgency.
This will generally involve the detention and interrogation of
suspected insurgents.
The detention policies applied to suspected insurgents have
become a point of significant controversy in the United States,
especially as a result of the prisoner abuses perpetrated at the Iraqi
prison Abu Ghraib63 and the legal questions regarding detainee
treatment and due process at Guantanamo Bay.64 Indeed, the
detainee abuse present at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib has led to
a significant loss of trust and faith—both at home65 and, crucially,
abroad66—in the capacity of the American government to act in an

62 Cf. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at 581.
alternate analogy:

Clausewitz offers a charming

A general uprising, as we see it, should be nebulous and elusive; its
resistance should never materialize as a concrete body . . . . On the other
hand, there must be some concentration at certain points: the fog must
thicken and form a dark and menacing cloud out of which a bolt of
lightning may strike at any time.
Id.
63 See, e.g., Former Vice President Al Gore, Address at New York University
(May 26, 2004) (transcript available http://www.moveon.org/pac/gorerumsfeld-transcript.html) (alluding to the reputational toll the Abu Ghraib
incident imposed on the United States).
64 See, e.g., Vatican Calls Prison Abuse a Bigger Blow to U.S. than Sept. 11, USA.
TODAY, May 12, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-12vatican-iraqi-abuse_x.htm (condemning the United States for its detention
practices in Guantanamo Bay).
65 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Just Shut It Down, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/27/opinion/27friedman.html (urging for the
closure of the Guantánamo facility).
66 See id. See also Maajid Nawaz, The Islamist Narrative, DAWN.COM, June 21,
2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/26584 (discussing the corrosive effect
of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo on both trust for the United States and respect
for human rights); Spencer Ackerman, Five Years Later, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 19,
2008, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=five_years_later
(determining that torture images from Abu Ghraib were prime motivators for
drawing recruits to Al-Qaeda in Iraq).
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honest fashion.67 Indeed, one commentator has dubbed it ―the U.S.
military‘s most serious setback since 9/11.‖68
The tendency for incumbents to react harshly towards captured
insurgents (or suspected insurgents) is perhaps most graphically
seen in the memoirs of General Paul Aussaresses. Aussaresses
served as the primary counterinsurgency implementation officer
for General Massu, the prefect of the city of Algiers during the
Battle of Algiers (Jan–March 1957),69 and was most directly
responsible for French action against the FLN insurgency there.70
Aussaresses‘s extremely candid memoir provides a great deal of
insight into the position of a determined incumbent willing to
target a civilian population. A conversation he had with a superior
officer, Colonel de Cockborne, places the issue of insurgent
treatment in the starkest light possible:
―And how do you handle the suspects afterwards?‖ asked
the colonel.
―You mean once they‘ve talked?‖
―That‘s right.‖
―If they‘re connected to the crimes perpetrated by the
terrorists, I shoot them.‖
―But you do understand that the bulk of the FLN is
involved in terrorism!‖ answered de Cockborne.
―Yes, I know that.‖

67 See JANE MEYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 312–313 (2008) (discussing
public perception of American detention practices).
68 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts?,
54 JOINT FORCE Q. 34, 34 (2009).
69 HORNE, supra note 53, at 188 (chronicling Governor-General Lacoste‘s
assignment of General Jacques Massu, a seasoned warrior commander, to
confront the pied noir counterinsurgency ―with total force . . . backed by the will to
use it‖).
70 PAUL AUSSARESSES, THE BATTLE OF THE CASBAH: TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN ALGERIA 1955–1957, at 72 (Robert L. Miller trans., 3d ed. 2006)
(describing Aussaresses‘s role as a deputy in charge of maintaining close ties to
the police departments, regimental commanders, and intelligence officers).
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―Wouldn‘t it be better to hand them over to the judicial
system rather than execute them? We can‘t just go around
knocking off every member of an organization! It‘s crazy!‖
―But, Colonel, that‘s what the highest governmental
authorities have decided. The courts don‘t want to handle
the FLN precisely because there are too many of them,
because we wouldn‘t know where to put them, and because
we can‘t just send hundreds of people to the guillotine. The
justice system is set up to handle a peacetime situation in
metropolitan France. This is Algeria, where a war is about
to start. . . . One thing is very clear: our mission demands
results, requiring torture and summary executions, and as
far as I can see it‘s only beginning.‖71
While public opinion was certainly a factor to the French
counterinsurgents in Algeria, as witnessed by Aussaresses‘s
comment (quoted above) that ―we can‘t just send hundreds of
people to the guillotine,‖ this did not deter the French government
from sanctioning the extralegal execution of captured FLN
members.72 Aussaresses mentions a magistrate reporting directly
to the Minister of Justice who all but instructed Aussaresses to kill
FLN leader Larbi Ben M‘Hidi:
―That‘s exactly what I mean. If you didn‘t search him [the
captured Ben M‘Hidi], you didn‘t find his cyanide capsule.‖
―What are you talking about?‖
―Well,‖ said Bérard, pronouncing each word carefully, ―I
won‘t be teaching you anything you don‘t already know.
All the top leaders [of the FLN] have a cyanide capsule. It‘s
a well-known fact.‖
What Bérard wanted to say, since he represented the
judiciary, was extremely clear to me . . . .73
The Algerian case is an example of counterinsurgency practice
supplanting the rule of law. As Aussaresses‘s quotes indicate, the
Id. at 21–22.
See id. at 15 (―[Policemen] spoke in hushed voices but were not ashamed of
using methods that everyone in the government back in Paris was well aware of . .
. .‖).
73 Id. at 136–37.
71
72
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French authorities, both civil and military, considered the French
judicial system inadequate for dealing with FLN members.
It is a blunt reality that any counterinsurgency must and will
engage in both detention and interrogation of suspected
insurgents. Some commentators, like Aussaresses, suggest that
torture is another one of the blunt realities presented in such a
situation, commenting that ―once a country demands that its army
fight an enemy who is using terror to compel an indifferent
population to join its ranks and provoke a repression that will in
turn outrage international public opinion, it becomes impossible
for that army to avoid using extreme measures.‖74 Others take the
approach of Alistair Horne, who notes that along with the
corrosive moral effects associated with torture,75 the long-term
costs from torture to French strategic goals in Algeria were
tremendous: the anger from French torture neutralized any
moderate Algerian Muslims (described as the ―interlocuteurs
valables‖ by Horne) who might have been able to achieve peace
earlier, and also weakened domestic public opinion in France to a
degree that continued efforts in Algeria were unsustainable.76
Neither Horne nor Aussaresses addresses directly, or in any
great detail, the effect of torture policies on the rule of law in
particular. Given Aussaresses‘s distaste for the capabilities of the
judicial system (―Even if the law had been enforced in all its
harshness, few persons would have been executed . . . .‖77 ―[T]o
hand the attorney over to the judicial system . . . meant, in effect,
granting him impunity . . . .‖78), this is understandable. However,
Horne does include a response from a French paratrooper
commander that highlights why the decision to torture is so
pernicious to establishing the rule of law, stating ―the army had
come to regard a prisoner as ‗no longer an Arab peasant‘ but
simply ‗a source of intelligence.‘‖79 The prisoners were no longer

Id. at xxxiv.
See HORNE, supra note 53, at 200–01 (examining the effects of French torture
practices in Algeria on the torturers).
76 See id. at 206–07 (analyzing the long-term effects that a policy sanctioning
torture in Algeria had on public opinion of France in Algeria and within France
itself).
77 AUSSARESSES, supra note 70, at 128.
78 Id. at 146.
79 HORNE, supra note 53, at 198.
74
75
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individuals entitled to the protection of the law, but simply
intelligence resources.
This trend towards dehumanization becomes even more
pernicious when one considers that false identification of
insurgents is a relatively common phenomenon. As Kalyvas &
Kocher point out, during an insurgency ―[s]tates (as well as
challengers) rely on individual informants who have incentives to
denounce their personal or local enemies.‖80 Even without
personal incentives like those mentioned by Kalyvas & Kocher
(informants extorting women for sexual favors and threatening to
term them Viet Cong members, or naming a loan holder a Viet
Cong member in order to avoid paying a debt81), the
counterinsurgent is likely to provide incentives for naming
insurgency members. For a current example, the BBC reported in
2006 that most detainees at Guantánamo Bay were not brought in
by American forces, but instead by bounty hunters, and only eight
percent (42 of the then 517 detainees at Guantánamo) were
confirmed al Qaeda fighters.82
If taken to its extremes, the depersonalization of the populace
can ultimately result in Hama-like policies. The Guatemalan
counterinsurgency campaign—the period between 1980 and 1983
dubbed ‗la violencia‘—contained an estimated 422 massacres
committed by the belligerent parties.83 Of the 422 massacres,
which resulted in approximately 14,000 deaths, it is estimated that
the Guatemalan government committed ninety percent of the
killings.84
One of the difficulties with reforming detention practices is the
potential for conflict between detention goals. It may seem like

80
81

raids).

Kalyvas & Kocher, supra note 59, at 207.
Id. at 207–08 (discussing the incentives used to extract information in

82 John Simpson, No Surprises in the War on Terror, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2006,
3:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4708946.stm (―Some 86% [of
detainees] were handed over in Afghanistan and Pakistan after a widespread
campaign in which big financial bounties were offered in exchange for anyone
suspected of links to al-Qaeda and the Taleban.‖).
83 Nathanael Heasley et al., Impunity in Guatemala: The State’s Failure to Provide
Justice in the Massacre Cases, 16 AM. U. INT‘L. L. REV. 1115, 1121–22 (2001)
(describing data compiled by the Recovery of Historical Memory Project on the
Guatemalan massacres).
84 Id.
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aggressive detention policies are most likely to be effective at
curtailing an insurgency by removing the insurgents from the
population quickly. However, this can easily backfire if the
incumbent is not careful and discriminating in detention policies.
Over-broad detention of the populace can easily cause the
population to begin supporting the insurgency.85
3.2. Uniting Traditional Sources of Law and Governance with
Establishing the Rule of Law
Due to the extreme pressures placed upon a society that is
undergoing an insurgency, an incumbent is placed in a position of
significant power over the legal framework and construction of the
society. Yet, for an incumbent‘s governance to be considered
legitimate, it must be a method of governance that is met with a
certain amount of approval from the populace. The governance
promulgated by an incumbent must be integrated into the cultural
and social mores of a given society.86 In situations where
alternative means of governance have been established, such as
local institutions not established by the incumbent, an incumbent
may be forced to accommodate these alternative means in order to
establish its own legitimacy and promote stability.87 While the
incumbent may seem to be the dominant actor on the scene, they
must bow to the political and practical realities of the situation;
only by using overwhelming force against a populace can the
populace be coerced into accepting a legal framework that it finds
to be fundamentally illegitimate.88
85 See JOES, supra note 22, at 156 (discussing the consequences of indiscriminate
severity against the population during a counterinsurgency).
86 See Rachel Kleinfeld & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Can a Post-Colonial Power Export
The Rule of Law? Elements of a General Framework, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW
139, 148 (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009) (―The rule of law is
about the relationship between state and society, and citizens must generally
follow the law without enforcement; only a despotic state will have the power to
enforce an ‗alien‘ rule of law.‖).
87 See Christopher J. Coyne & Adam Pellillo, The Art of Seeing Like a State:
State-Building in Afghanistan, the Congo, and Beyond, REV. OF AUSTRIAN ECON.
(forthcoming), available at www.ccoyne.com/The_Art_of_Seeing_Like_a_State.pdf
(discussing the role of non-governmental institutions and governance,
particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan).
88 See Mark Martins, Lawfare: So Are We Waging It?, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/11/lawfare-so-are-we-waging-it/ (―Security
rooted in such force may earn a government a short season of willing allegiance
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However, this does raise potential tensions with some of the
principles of the rule of law discussed at the outset of this
Comment.
Several societies possess mixed legal systems,
combining civil codes with religious legal frameworks.89
Furthermore, the legal system itself may be bifurcated, with
parallel judicial and dispute-resolution systems existing
simultaneously, as is the case in regions of both Pakistan and
Afghanistan; the traditional jirga, a tribal council, often issues legal
rulings and resolves disputes, rather than sending them to the
state‘s justice system.90 The degree of bifurcation can vary: an
April 2009 investigation of Afghanistan‘s Helmand Province found
that in some districts, judges integrated elements of the jirgas into
their courts, while in others, the formal judicial system is virtually
non-existent.91 The informal justice system is estimated to ―deal
with at least 90% of all dispute resolution in Helmand.‖92
Bifurcation of the judicial system can be a significant problem
for the incumbent during a counterinsurgency. As discussed supra
Section 1.1.2, an insurgent will seek to out-administer the
incumbent, and the judiciary plays a significant role in the
governance of any given territory. By exploiting the tensions that
inherently exist between the components of a bifurcated legal
system, an insurgent can carve out a socially accepted role for its
own governance. For example, the Taliban exploited the tensions
between the official Afghan legal system (the formal tool of the
government) and the jirgas (the informal, traditional method of
resolving disputes) to create its own traveling courts,93 which were
from a population grateful to be relieved of attacks, but legitimacy—and
effectiveness beyond the near term—comes from more than power alone.‖).
89 See THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.‘S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY & CTR. FOR
LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER‘S GUIDE
FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 114 (2010), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au
/awc/awcgate/law/rule_of_law_hdbk.pdf [hereinafter RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK]
(discussing mixed legal systems, including civil, common law systems and civil
law and religious legal systems).
90 See Niloufer Siddiqui, Broken Justice, FOREIGN POL‘Y, AFPAK CHANNEL (Feb.
1,
2011,
10:43
AM),
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/01
/broken_justice (examining the bifurcated legal system of Pakistan‘s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas).
91 See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 268–71.
92 Id. at 274.
93 See Gary Anderson, The Closers (Part III): Civilians in the Hold Phase, SMALL
WARS J. 1, 9 (Mar. 3, 2011, 3:39 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com
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then perceived to dispense speedier and fairer justice than either
pre-existing legal system.94
When faced with a bifurcated judicial system, an incumbent
may opt to integrate the bifurcation into the existing formalized
legal system, as was done in Helmand Province. By explicitly
authorizing the use of the informal justice system for non-criminal
dispute resolution or minor crimes, while funneling serious cases
to the formal system,95 both the traditional and the formal systems
ideally gain legitimacy. The traditional system will hopefully be
recognized as a part of the nation‘s legal infrastructure, while
leaders of the traditional system (religious leaders of the
community and tribal leaders) become more willing to support the
formal legal system. The danger in this approach is that instead of
enhancing legitimacy for both sides, this may present the
incumbent as weak, unable to fully enforce the use of its judicial
system. The flip side of this is that attempting to interfere too
much with the informal justice system may be perceived as
government over-interference with the traditional beliefs, values,
and mores of the population, and may cause an upswing in
insurgent support.
Even without systemic issues such as bifurcation of the judicial
system, rule of law actions taken in a counterinsurgency campaign
have the potential to make major changes to the fabric of a
society.96 The incumbent must therefore be cognizant of the legal
basis and the sources of law that are being used to establish
governance for a population. What if the pre-existing sources of
law conflict with components of the rule of law which the
government is seeking to establish? For example, utilizing
traditional sources of law regarding the status of women or of
/blog/journal/docs-temp/685-anderson.pdf (explaining how the Taliban courts
have filled the void left by unresponsive government courts).
94 See Andrew Garfield, What Afghans Want 1, 5–6, FOREIGN POL‘Y RES. INST.,
E-NOTES,
(November,
2009),
http://www.glevumassociates.com/doc
/WhatAfghansWant.pdf (describing corruption in the central government and
limited judicial access as areas of primary concern to Afghans); RULE OF LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 205, 269 (suggesting reasons that Taliban judicial
systems were sometimes favored by Afghans).
95 See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 274–75 (explaining why
having a bifurcated justice system is reasonable in Helmand).
96 See Note, Counterinsurgency and Constitutional Design, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1622, 1630 (2008) (arguing that counterinsurgency can function as de facto
constitutional design).
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minority groups may decrease the protection of human rights,97
which (as discussed supra Sections 1.1.1, 1.2) is considered a
significant component of the rule of law. One embarrassing
example of poor selection of sources of law is evident in the 1999
UN intervention in Kosovo. To ensure that a legal system was in
place, the head of the UN civilian administration issued a
regulation stating that pre-intervention law, enacted before March
24, 1999 (the date of the intervention), would be the law of the
land, without realizing that the bulk of the Kosovar population
viewed the laws of the time as fundamentally oppressive and
imposed upon them by a Serb minority.98
One solution advanced by some scholars to the problem of
potential human rights violations in legal sources is to lay the
grounds for systemic changes in society through a ―bottom-up
development policy‖ of strengthening institutions of civil society
(such as the educational system, press, and non-government
organizations). 99 This method has the potential for great effect, but
it is intrinsically a long-term solution, focusing as it does on a
gradual cultural change. An incumbent must seek both long-term
and short-term solutions.
A legal framework will obviously be strongest when the
population it governs believes that it is authentic and not
externally imposed.100 This applies to both peaceful situations as
well as situations involving counterinsurgency. In an article for
the blog Lawfare, Thomas Nachbar addresses this problem:
Codified rules or government practices that enhance
security but lack a connection to a population‘s normative
commitments similarly lack legitimacy—such laws are
what Hart described as mere rules backed by force, not law.
97 See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 270–71 (examining
weaknesses in the informal judicial system of Helmand Province).
98 STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 316–17 (describing how ―well-intentioned
rule of law promotion efforts can sometimes inadvertently undermine the rule of
law‖).
99 See Kleinfeld & Nicolaidis, supra note 86, at 161–62 (discussing the
―bottom-up‖ approach to development which employs indirect methods such as
providing funding to NGOs).
100 See, e.g., id. at 157 (noting that EU officials decided against conditioning
funding on the passage of a law because the Albanian population would
purportedly deem it illegitimate and unenforceable due to the presence of the
external conditionality).
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Thus counterinsurgency doctrine‘s central place for
legitimacy is doubly the case for uses of law in
counterinsurgency . . . . [T]he inextricable connection
between this particular tool of counterinsurgency and the
population‘s underlying normative commitments makes
any attempt to use law without attention to its grounding
in those commitments—its legitimacy—unwise and likely
counterproductive.101
The incumbent must not overreach beyond the limits of the society
it is a part of. As Stromseth and her co-authors note, ―The rule of
law is as much a culture as a set of institutions, as much a matter of
the habits, commitments, and beliefs of ordinary people as of legal
codes.‖102 By overextending, the incumbent would decrease the
chances for lasting rule of law reform.
3.3. Legal Constraints on the Incumbent
Due to the practical realities of counterinsurgency (or indeed,
any sort of warfare), forces of the incumbent will commit crimes
against the populace. The question then arises: How is the
incumbent to respond to these crimes? The international law of
occupation is considered to be encompassed in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, the Hague Convention, and the nebulous area of
customary international law,103 but these do not provide significant
guidance on the extent to which an incumbent is bound by its legal
codes during a counterinsurgency.104 A significant amount of
tension exists on this point. While state accountability to its own
legal system is a pillar of the rule of law, how much is an
incumbent government willing to submit to constraints that may
impede its ability to act?

101 Thomas Nachbar, Lawfare and the Authority of Law, LAWFARE (Jan. 4, 2011,
10:22 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/01/tom-nachbar-on-lawfareand-the-authority-of-law.
102 STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 310.
103 See Walker, supra note 51, at 260 (noting that the Geneva Convention, the
Hague Convention, and customary international law traditionally make up the
international law of belligerent occupation).
104 See id. at 275 (noting that the Conventions are often silent regarding the
scope of authority by occupiers in some realms).
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Thomas Nachbar suggests that legal constraints on the
incumbent can act as a significant force multiplier for the
incumbent in the long term:
Sometimes that commitment will actually result in a shortterm victory for insurgents—what some might call the
insurgents‘ ―unfair‖ use of law to hinder military
prosecution of the conflict. Perhaps the most salient
measure of the legitimacy of any state are the rules (and
maybe even more importantly the degree to which the state
follows them) that govern its exertion of force, especially
exertion of force against its own citizens. As General
Martins argues, ―[c]ompliance with law is what legitimates
the actions of our troops and separates their actions—
sometimes necessarily violent and lethal—from what very
bad people in criminal mobs do.‖ If General Martins is
correct that most people would rather live under a state
that is governed by law rather than the will of men (and I
think he is), this use of law may be the most powerful one
in the conduct of a counterinsurgency—to again borrow
General Martins‘ terminology, this is the way the
government outflanks insurgents.105
In other words, the tactical loss present in a delayed military
prosecution of the conflict yields a strategic gain in the form of
separating the incumbent from the insurgent, one where the rule of
law provides a justification to the population as to why supporting
the incumbent is the superior choice.
However, this cannot suffice on its own to demonstrate the
worthwhile nature of a government. While curtailing its activities
through the lens of the rule of law, an incumbent must also be able
to effectively prosecute the armed conflict portion of
counterinsurgency. As Mark Martins notes, ―If a government lacks
the power to defend itself and its people against violence and
predatory corruption, it will be discredited and regarded as
illegitimate even if it brings itself to adhere scrupulously to the law
and otherwise comes to be deserving of allegiance.‖106

105
106

Nachbar, supra note 101.
Martins, supra note 88.
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Peter Stirk suggests that equal treatment between an external
incumbent and the population is impossible: ―Even where
occupiers have sought justice, it has never been a justice of the
equality of all before the law, of common subjection to the same
rules, for the rules and the structural nature of military occupation
have assigned a different status to the occupier and inhabitant.‖107
Some external incumbents have sought to constrain the actions of
their own forces and provide accountability, but even these
incumbents have consistently avoided placing their forces under
the jurisdiction of the population‘s court system.108
While there are extreme legal constraints that an incumbent is
not likely to apply to itself, it is in the best interest of an incumbent
to ensure that the populace perceives it as being fair (along with
the incumbent actually being fair), and legal constraints help to
demonstrate this.109
The United States Foreign Claims Act
provides an example of the type of legislation which incumbents
will likely use. The Foreign Claims Act takes some steps to
provide legal constraints, by providing a method by which
individuals may obtain redress for claims against the American
military. However, the Act restricts claims to instances not arising
in combat.110
It is not enough for an incumbent government to act in a
legitimate manner; it must also be perceived to be acting in a
legitimate manner.111 Due to the likely antagonistic relationship
between the incumbent and the population, this perception of
legitimacy may be one of the most difficult tasks the incumbent
faces. Even in circumstances where incumbent forces are held
accountable for potential human rights violations and go through
PETER M.R. STIRK, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION 195 (2009).
See id. at 183–89 (discussing attempts by occupiers to exercise legal
accountability over their own forces, but noting the occupiers‘ hesitance to
prosecute their forces within the indigenous legal systems).
109 Anthony James Joes‘s discussion of the concept of ―rectitude,‖ meaning
right action towards the populace, mirrors this concept to some extent. See JOES,
supra note 22, at 156–65 (detailing the concept of rectitude, which holds that forces
should act lawfully and according to upstanding moral standards).
110 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b)(3) (2006) (stating that a claim may only be allowed if,
inter alia, ―it did not arise from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly
from an act of the armed forces of the United States in combat‖).
111 See Dunlap, supra note 68, at 35 (noting that improper acts by an
incumbent or lack of public support for an incumbent can undermine perceptions
of its legitimacy).
107
108
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trial procedures, the public may still not deem such recourse as
legitimate. For example, after the 2005 Haditha massacre in Iraq
(twenty-four Iraqis died from American fire after an American
convoy was hit by an improvised explosive device (IED)),112 all but
one of the Marines involved in the incident either had the charges
against them dropped or were found not guilty.113 Due to the
sensitive and shocking nature of the incident and the perceived
lack of legitimacy on the part of the United States by the Iraqi
people, the decisions to drop charges were met with skepticism
and disbelief.114 Because of the lack of legitimacy which the United
States brought to the table, the entire trial mechanism was tainted
in the eyes of the Iraqi populace.
3.4. Amnesty versus Prosecution of Insurgents
One of the most potentially problematic tensions between the
requirements of counterinsurgency strategy and the establishment
of the rule of law is the issue of amnesty towards insurgents, war
criminals, and human rights violators. Insurgencies rarely end
through an incumbent‘s application of force; instead, they usually
end through co-opting less committed members of the insurgency
and integrating them into the incumbent‘s society.115 Joes points to

112 See A Horror that Will Not Be Buried, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2006,
http://www.economist.com/node/6999468?story_id=6999468&fsrc=RSS
(discussing an investigation which revealed that U.S. troops participated in a
massacre and killed Iraqi civilians, many of whom were believed to be unarmed).
113 See Tony Perry, Court Hearing Begins for Marine in Iraqi Civilian Deaths, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009, 1:50 PM) http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow
/2009/03/court-martial.html (noting that of the eight marines initially charged,
―[c]ases against six of them [were] dropped, and one was found not guilty‖).
114 For example, one Iraqi lamented:

I‘m not satisfied with the outcome because the punishments don‘t come
close to the crimes committed in Haditha. We expected that the soldiers
would be exonerated. From the first moment, we expected that. I
thought the soldiers would be let off or claim insanity. All of these
excuses we expected from the beginning.
Frontline: Rules of Engagement (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2008) (transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha
/etc/script.html).
115 See Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that ―political
accommodation,‖ and not military defeat, causes insurgencies to ―fade away‖); see
also JOES, supra note 22, at 166–70 (noting that amnesty programs can be used as
effective means of ending insurgencies).
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the Chieu Hoi program operating during the Vietnam War—an
amnesty program which ―‗had the most favorable cost/benefit
ratio of any counterinsurgency operation in Viet Nam,‘‖—to
suggest that an amnesty can be an extremely powerful tool for an
incumbent.116 On the other hand, as Voorhoeve notes, ―It is
particularly bitter to the population if war criminals are given
amnesty as part of a cease-fire agreement or peace deal. This is one
of the harshest examples of the trade-off between peace and
justice.‖117
The trade-off between peace and justice trends towards peace
in the eyes of most scholars considering the question. As Schlunck
notes, ―As long as those who are responsible for brutal crime either
still hold positions with the government or form an influential
constituency [like former members of an insurgency], they
participate in the negotiations and the transition process.‖118 And
even Schlunck, one of the drafters of the International Criminal
Court, is forced to concede that ―the precondition for effective
conflict management is the cessation of hostilities . . . .
[N]egotiators will probably still take recourse to amnesties for
massive human rights violations with a view to stopping the
fighting.‖119
Joes suggests an alternate route for those
uncomfortable with the idea of amnesty for insurgent leaders,
proposing that ―no amnesty should be available to guerrillas
accused of personal criminal acts; instead huge cash bounties
should be placed on their heads.‖120 While this may seem
attractive, the purpose of offering amnesty is to whittle away
support from the insurgency and provide alternatives to its
members; without the possibility of this amnesty, the most
personally dangerous members will likely remain the most
intransigent.
An example of the amnesty process can be seen in Iraq‘s
―Anbar Awakening.‖ In 2006, several (minority) Sunni tribes
116 JOES, supra note 22, at 169 (quoting JEANNETTE A. KOCH, THE CHIEU HOI
PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1963-1971, at vi (RAND, R-1172-ARPA, 1973),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports
/2006/R1172.pdf).
117 VOORHOEVE, supra note 7, at 111.
118 SCHLUNCK, supra note 33, at 249.
119 Id.
120 JOES, supra note 22, at 167.
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began seeking to move away from their former Al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) partners and instead partner with the United States and Iraqi
governments.121 In some cases, members of the tribes had been
former insurgents,122 but after noting that AQI seemed to be intent
on supplanting the tribal structure for control of both smuggling
operations in Anbar and tribal territory itself, they concluded that
it was in their best interest to turn on AQI.123 In others, the AQI
brutality towards family members and loved ones spurred them to
throw in with the incumbents.124
The incumbents took the opportunity presented by the
cooperative tribes to bring them into the fold by using tribal forces
as ―neighborhood watch groups,‖125 as well as integrating them
into Iraqi police forces.126 With American funding, Sunni tribes
were convinced to either switch allegiance to the incumbents or to,
at the very least, remain neutral parties and refrain from aiding
AQI. While the prior actions of the Sunni tribal leaders were cause
for concern, incumbent leaders ultimately concluded that the tribes
would likely be ―reliable partners,‖ given their self-interested
position of allying against al Qaeda.127 As tribes shifted allegiance,

121 See Dave Kilcullen, Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt, SMALL WARS J. BLOG (Aug.
29, 2007, 1:52 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt
(describing how the self-interest of certain Iraqi tribes aligned with the interests of
the United States and Iraqi governments against al Qaeda).
122 See Colin Freeman, Iraqi Neighbours Rise Up Against al-Qa’eda, TELEGRAPH
Apr. 12, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1584898/Iraqineighbours-rise-up-against-al-Qaeda.html (explaining that many Iraqis,
previously sympathetic with al Qaeda‘s anti-occupation message, began to view
al Qaeda not as ―resistance fighters,‖ but as ―liars and terrorists‖).
123 See John A. McCary, The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives, 32
WASH. Q. 43, 47–48 (2009) (explaining that al Qaeda‘s violent political takeover of
Anbar pushed some tribal leaders to ally with the United States).
124 See Freeman, supra note 122 (detailing various incidences of brutality
leveled by al Qaeda against the tribes).
125 Id.
126 See Thomas R. Searle, Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical Role
of Special Operations Forces, 50 JOINT FORCE Q. 62, 65–66 (2008) (noting that tribal
support led to a surge in police force volunteers, which was crucial for defeating
al Qaeda).
127 See Jim Michaels, An Army Colonel’s Gamble Pays Off in Iraq, USA TODAY,
May 1, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-30-ramadicolonel_n.htm (stating that a trust based on mutual self-interest developed
between U.S. forces and tribal leaders; for example, U.S. forces gained ―an Iraqi
police force,‖ while tribal leaders secured protection for their families).
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insurgent attacks in their territory decreased dramatically.128
However, by 2010 this promising picture had changed
considerably. The (largely Shia) Iraqi government took over
administration of the Awakening program in 2008, prompting
concerns from Sunnis that the government would start disbanding
their units or even arresting former insurgent leaders.129 In
September 2010, hundreds of Sunni tribesmen police, who had
been integrated into Iraqi security forces, were dismissed by the
Iraqi Interior Ministry,130 and many began rejoining AQI.131 As of
the time of this Comment, the ultimate results of the Anbar
Awakening remain to be seen.
The amnesty offered to the Anbar Awakening members, along
with the falling out between AQI and the Awakening tribes,
caused the initial shift in the Awakening tribes from nominally
insurgent-allied to allying with the incumbent. This co-opting of
the Sunni tribes did in fact provide greatly increased security to
Anbar while the partnership was in effect.132 However, it is
important to consider the ramifications of the Anbar Awakening
beyond the increased security provided. Firstly, the amnesty
provided to the various tribal forces went beyond direct amnesty—
insurgency fighters were actually co-opted by the incumbents.
However, the method by which the Sunni tribes were brought to
128 See Kilcullen, Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt, supra note 121 (discussing a
reduction in improvised explosive device (IED) and other attacks throughout
various regions).
129 See Erica Goode, U.S. Military Will Transfer Control of Sunni Citizen Patrols
to Iraqi Government, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/09/02/world/middleeast/02iraq.html (describing some of the problems
foreseen in a transfer of control over ―the Sunni-dominated citizen patrols known
as Awakening Councils‖ to the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government).
130 See Leila Fadel, Sunni Awakening Officers are Kicked Off Police Force in Iraq,
WASH.
POST,
Sept.
27,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/26/AR2010092603533.html (detailing a plan by the
Iraqi Interior Ministry to remove scores of officers from the American police
force).
131 See Timothy Williams & Duraid Adnan, Sunnis in Iraq Allied With U.S.
Rejoin Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010
/10/17/world/middleeast/17awakening.html?_r=1&ref=global-home
(describing a change in loyalty by many members of the Awakening Councils,
many ―rejoin[ing] Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia‖).
132 See McCary, supra note 123, at 55 (noting the ―unprecedented level of
cooperation and coordination‖ between U.S. military commanders and local tribal
heads).
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work with the incumbents meant that not only did the sheikhs
continue to function as the local power brokers,133 but they began
to function as a separate power bloc within Iraq. The amnesties
offered to the Sunni tribes were also possible in part because of
their limited direct support for AQI; as one American officer noted,
―There might be a few guys among them who were shooting at us
before, but I would say that for most, the worst thing they might
have done is maybe made the odd phone call on behalf of the
insurgents.‖134
Above all, it must be remembered that past counterinsurgency
efforts in one nation do not necessarily translate to efforts in
another. American attempts to engineer an ―Afghan Awakening‖
amnesty and reintegration program based on the Anbar
Awakening have resulted in a miniscule yield; an estimated three
percent of Taliban fighters have chosen to engage with the Afghan
Peace and Reintegration Program.135
4.

CONCLUSIONS

4.1. Synergistic Nature of Counterinsurgency and the Rule of Law
As we have seen, counterinsurgency and the rule of law
operate in a synergistic manner. Safeguarding the rule of law
demonstrates that a state is capable of governing effectively and in
a legitimate fashion, which increases the willingness of a
population to support the government. A population-centric
counterinsurgency will likely strengthen existing instruments of
the rule of law, and take steps to ensure that the population is
provided with governance they perceive as being authentic and
legitimate.
Furthermore, failures in one will harm the other. By presenting
a populace with illegitimate governance, an incumbent indicates
that the insurgency is capable of providing better government—or

133 See Kilcullen, Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt, supra note 121 (explaining the
parallel power structure that exists in Iraq, with tribal leaders competing for
power with the formal national government).
134 Freeman, supra note 122.
135 See Spencer Ackerman, A Year in, Amnesty Deal Lures Only Three Percent of
Taliban, WIRED (Jan. 3, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom
/2011/01/a-year-in-amnesty-deal-lures-only-3-percent-of-taliban/ (detailing the
relatively modest success of an amnesty program in Afghanistan).
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at least an equivalent form. By failing to protect a population and
ensure that security issues are dealt with, an incumbent will
weaken societal reliance on governmental institutions such as the
police or the courts.
4.2. Strictly Short-Term Security Gains Damage Both
Counterinsurgency and the Rule of Law
An incumbent is put in a difficult position regarding its
conduct in response to a counterinsurgency campaign. If the
violence of an insurgency is allowed to persist then the populace is
likely to lose faith in the government,136 or possibly support the
insurgent.137 However, the more direct measures the government
takes to quell the insurgency, the more it may approach
indiscriminate violence as described by Kalyvas & Kocher;138 the
al-Assad method of counterinsurgency provides an extreme
example.
Co-opting the rule of law to the needs of a counterinsurgency
effort may seem desirable for an incumbent, but this is ultimately
penny-wise and pound-foolish. Using the rule of law strictly as a
method for strengthening a counterinsurgency, without paying
heed to its aspects of accountability for the state or protection of
human rights, would fatally wound the legitimacy of the rule of
law.139
A focus on measures designed to maximize short-term
efficiency will also lead to a lack of sustainability. Chappuis &
Hänggi point to security sector reform in Afghanistan, where a
―focus on operational capacity-building to the neglect of long-term
136 See DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ: INSIDE THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION
FIASCO 158 (2005) (―As violence mounted, Iraqi resentment of the United States
also increased.‖).
137 See Kalyvas & Kocher, supra note 59, at 189–90 (explaining that when
indiscriminate state violence increases, the population may look to the insurgent
for protection from the state or even join the insurgent, who is more capable of
selective violence).
138 Id. at 210 (presenting data from the Greek Civil War indicating that
noncombatants in the Argolid perished at higher rates than combatants because
they were ―between two fires‖— targeted by both sides simultaneously).
139 See Kilcullen Interview, supra note 43, at 3 (noting that because the Afghan
government abused and oppressed the local population, town elders had expelled
the government officials and embraced the Taliban in 2008; assessing the
challenge of the Marjah operation begins with understanding the Taliban
presence in the town as a symptom of Afghan government abuse).
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training . . . led to a contradiction between human security and
state security as the ability of the state to protect itself increased
with the efficiency of the army but human security deteriorated in
great part due to unsuccessful police reform.‖140 A surge requires
the presence of large numbers of troops, forcing an incumbent to
keep significant resources committed to that effort. Successes in
establishing security after a sudden influx of force may be
potentially short-lived; successes in establishing the rule of law,
with its requirements for equal treatment of citizens and
constraints on the use of state power, will probably be even shorter
in duration.
4.3. Final Conclusions
Some counterinsurgency experts are dubious about the utility
of legitimacy to the incumbent. When John Nagl was asked
whether an illegitimate government could defeat an insurgency, he
responded that ―the government only has to be seen as more
legitimate and better for the population than the insurgents.‖141
This is not entirely accurate. While Nagl may be correct that the
bare minimum legitimacy necessary for the government is simply
to be ―better‖ than the insurgents, it is misleading to think that this
bare minimum is likely to be an effective method of concluding a
counterinsurgency. Nagl‘s suggestion may be a possible method
for convincing the populace of a nation to side with the incumbent,
but it will not effectively demonstrate that the incumbent can
provide security and legitimacy in the long term, and may even
foster the conditions for another potential insurgency in the future.
One criticism that may be levied against this work is that the
suggestions for incumbents presented here represent objectives
that are more aspirational than pragmatic.142 One commentator
Chappuis & Hänggi, supra note 35, at 52.
Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 4.
142 See Interview by Maria Costigan with Jaqueline Hazelton, Former
Research Fellow, Harvard Kennedy Sch. Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int‘l Affairs in
Cambridge, Ma. (Dec. 3, 2010) (video and transcript available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20860/interview_with_jacqueli
ne_jill_hazelton.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F2085%2Fjacqueline_l_hazelton
(arguing that the process of counterinsurgency as a form of state building,
including limiting the use of military force to prevent alienating civilians
through casualties, is an ideal model that has never been successfully
implemented).
140
141
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has suggested that population-centric counterinsurgency ―doesn‘t
bear any resemblance to what has succeeded in counterinsurgency
in the past.‖143 In some ways this is true; population-centric
methods have had mixed results while strongly coercive methods
applied against the population certainly have been successful in
the past, such as the actions of al-Assad in Syria and Aussaresses in
Algeria. At the same time, it is very possible that a populationcentric counterinsurgency is the only one that a nation even
somewhat concerned with human rights and the rule of law can
hope to wage effectively.
One of the most fundamental
determining factors in warfare is the willingness of a nation to
continue engaging in the conflict.144 If an incumbent government
adopts a strategy fundamentally hostile to the norms of its
population base, concern over the nature of the conflict will
ultimately sap the incumbent‘s willingness to continue fighting
and render the entire conflict pointless.
When writing of the French army‘s defeat at the hands of the
Wehrmacht during the Second World War, historian Eugenia
Kiesling noted that ―Daladier and Gamelin worked within the
institutions of the Republic they served. . . . [The French army] was
an army unready for war against the Wehrmacht in 1940, but it
could not have been different and remained the army of the Third
Republic.‖145 Similarly, any incumbent power will be constrained
by the de facto limits that its society imposes upon it. As Alistair
Horne suggests, by 1962, the violence of the Algerian War, and in
particular, the actions of the Organisation de l‘armée secrète
(O.A.S.), a right-wing French nationalist group fighting for French
control of Algeria, were the tipping factors in the ultimate loss of
public support for a French presence in Algeria.146 Turmoil over
French conduct in the Algerian war had already contributed to the

Id.
See CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at 90 (discussing the varying ability of
political objectives to mobilize the forces required for war, including public
support).
145 EUGENIA C. KIESLING, ARMING AGAINST HITLER: FRANCE AND THE LIMITS OF
MILITARY PLANNING 188 (1996).
146 See HORNE, supra note 53, at 504 (discussing anti-government sentiment of
the French public following police violence at a civilian rally protesting O.A.S.
violence in Algeria).
143
144
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French government collapse in May 1958.147 It is not unreasonable
to suggest that if an incumbent goes beyond a certain threshold of
brutality in a counterinsurgency campaign, it will likely face
domestic difficulties similar to the French government.
How, then, can a democratic incumbent effectively wage a
counterinsurgency? The best option is to engage in populationcentric counterinsurgency while continuing to support the rule of
law. This is not an easy process. No war is. But support for the
rule of law within counterinsurgency efforts affords the incumbent
the best chance for a successful counterinsurgency campaign—of
removing incentives for insurgency and building a lasting peace.

147 Id. at 273–98 (examining the Algerian impetus to de Gaulle‘s 1958 assent to
power).
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